

UNIT III CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Fundamental Corporate Governance Theories

2.1. Agency Theory

Agency theory having its roots in economic theory was expounded by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and further developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Agency theory is defined as “*the relationship between the principals, such as shareholders and agents such as the company executives and managers*”. In this theory, shareholders who are the owners or principals of the company, hire the agents to perform work. Principals delegate the running of business to the directors or managers, who are the shareholder’s agents (Clarke, 2004). Indeed, Daily et al (2003) argued that two factors can influence the prominence of agency theory. First, the theory is conceptually and simple theory that reduces the corporation to two participants of managers and shareholders. Second, agency theory suggests that employees or managers in organizations can be self-interested. The agency theory shareholders expect the agents to act and make decisions in the principal’s interest. On the contrary, the agent may not necessarily make decisions in the best interests of the principals (Padilla, 2000). Such a problem was first highlighted by Adam Smith in the 18th century and subsequently explored by Ross (1973) and the first detailed description of agency theory was presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Indeed, the notion of problems arising from the separation of ownership and control in agency theory has been confirmed by Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997). In agency theory, the agent may be succumbed to self-interest, opportunistic behavior and falling short of congruence between the aspirations of the principal and the agent’s pursuits. Even the understanding of risk defers in its approach. Although with such setbacks, agency theory was introduced basically as a separation of ownership and control (Bhimani, 2008). Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) argued that instead of providing fluctuating incentive payments, the agents will only focus on projects that have a high return and have a fixed wage without any incentive component. Although this will provide a fair assessment, but it does not eradicate or even minimize corporate misconduct. Here, the positivist approach is used where the agents are controlled by principal-made rules, with the aim of maximizing shareholders value. Hence, a more individualistic view is applied in this theory (Clarke, 2004). Indeed, agency theory can be employed to explore the relationship between the ownership and management structure. However, where there is a separation, the agency model can

UNIT III CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

90 *Middle Eastern Finance and Economics - Issue 4 (2009)*

be applied to align the goals of the management with that of the owners. Due to the fact that in a family

firm, the management comprises of family members, hence the agency cost would be minimal as any

firm's performance does not really affect the firm performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). The model of an

employee portrayed in the agency theory is more of a self-interested, individualistic and are bounded

rationality where rewards and punishments seem to take priority (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

This

theory prescribes that people or employees are held accountable in their tasks and responsibilities.

Employees must constitute a good governance structure rather than just providing the need of shareholders, which maybe challenging the governance structure.

Figure 1: The Agency Model

Self

interest

Self

interest

Performs

Hires & delegate

Principals Agents

2.2. Stewardship Theory

Stewardship theory has its roots from psychology and sociology and is defined by Davis, Schoorman &

Donaldson (1997) as *"a steward protects and maximises shareholders wealth through firm performance, because by so doing, the steward's utility functions are maximised"*. In this perspective,

stewards are company executives and managers working for the shareholders, protects and make

profits for the shareholders. Unlike agency theory, stewardship theory stresses not on the perspective of

individualism (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), but rather on the role of top management being as stewards,

integrating their goals as part of the organization. The stewardship perspective suggests that stewards

are satisfied and motivated when organizational success is attained.

Agyris (1973) argues agency theory looks at an employee or people as an economic being, which suppresses an individual's own aspirations. However, stewardship theory recognizes the importance of structures that empower the steward and offers maximum autonomy built on trust

(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). It stresses on the position of employees or executives to act more autonomously so that the shareholders' returns are maximized. Indeed, this can minimize the costs

aimed at monitoring and controlling behaviours (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997).

On the other end, Daly et al. (2003) argued that in order to protect their reputations as decision makers in organizations, executives and directors are inclined to operate the firm to maximize financial

performance as well as shareholders' profits. In this sense, it is believed that the firm's performance

UNIT III CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

can directly impact perceptions of their individual performance. Indeed, Fama (1980) contend that

executives and directors are also managing their careers in order to be seen as effective stewards of

their organization, whilst, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) insists that managers return finance to investors

to establish a good reputation so that that can re-enter the market for future finance. Stewardship model

can have linking or resemblance in countries like Japan, where the Japanese worker assumes the role of

stewards and takes ownership of their jobs and work at them diligently.

Moreover, stewardship theory suggests unifying the role of the CEO and the chairman so as to reduce agency costs and to have greater role as stewards in the organization. It was evident that there

would be better safeguarding of the interest of the shareholders. It was empirically found that the

returns have improved by having both these theories combined rather than separated (Donaldson and

Davis, 1991).

Middle Eastern Finance and Economics - Issue 4 (2009) 91

Figure 2: The Stewardship Model

Intrinsic and

extrinsic

motivation

Shareholders'

profits and

returns

Protects and maximise

shareholders wealth

Empower and

trust

Shareholders Stewards

2.3. Stakeholder Theory

Stakeholder theory was embedded in the management discipline in 1970 and gradually developed by

Freeman (1984) incorporating corporate accountability to a broad range of stakeholders.

Wheeler et al,

(2002) argued that stakeholder theory derived from a combination of the sociological and organizational disciplines. Indeed, stakeholder theory is less of a formal unified theory and more of a

broad research tradition, incorporating philosophy, ethics, political theory, economics, law and organizational science.

Stakeholder theory can be defined as “*any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives*”. Unlike agency theory in which the managers are

working and serving for the stakeholders, stakeholder theorists suggest that managers in organizations

have a network of relationships to serve – this include the suppliers, employees and business partners.

And it was argued that this group of network is important other than owner-manager-employee relationship as in agency theory (Freeman, 1999). On the other end, Sundaram & Inkpen (2004)

UNIT III CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

contend that stakeholder theory attempts to address the group of stakeholder deserving and requiring management's attention. Whilst, Donaldson & Preston (1995) claimed that all groups participate in a business to obtain benefits. Nevertheless, Clarkson (1995) suggested that the firm is a system, where there are stakeholders and the purpose of the organization is to create wealth for its stakeholders. Freeman (1984) contends that the network of relationships with many groups can affect decision making

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